Pour bien installer l'Ukraine dans l'UE|
[Most Recent Entries]
Below are the 14 most recent journal entries recorded in
Pour bien installer l'Ukraine dans l'UE's LiveJournal:
|Tuesday, December 4th, 2007|
У зв’язку з продажем LiveJournal в управління російській компанії СУП я поступово закриваю тут всяку активність. Якщо когсь цікавить перебрати цю спільноту - прохання повідомити до 01.2008 Якщо ні, спільноту буде закрито. Прошу вибачення у всіх дописувачів.
|Tuesday, November 20th, 2007|
Президент Чекалін вийшов з залу прес конференцій дивлячись у підлогу. Охорона знала - якщо погляд президента опущений вниз, значить президент розсерджений. Передчуваючи неприємну розмову до нього наблизився держсеркретар Богов.
- Ну як все пройшло...
- Виклич мого писаря... Давай, терміново. - відрубав президент.
В кабінет зайшов керівник Депертаменту Зв’язків з Пресою.
Намагаючись тихо закрити двері він довго стояв спиною до господаря кабінету. Президент незадоволено мугикнув і рвучко піднявся зробивши декілька кроків в сторону вікна.
- Вам потрібно бути більш кмітливими у вашому депертаменті - сказав він дивлячись у вікно.
За вікном відкривалася широка площа внутрішнього двору адміністрації президента. Падав білий сніг і чіплявся за виступи старовинної площі відтінюючи контури середньовікової споруди білими смугами. Цю внутрішню площу не показували по телевізору але сама площа бачила багато. Сніг падав на холодну бруківку і піднімався протягами вітру назад вгору, до сірого непрозорого неба.
В кабінеті було троє. Чиновник з білим від переляку обличчам і два керівника держави. Держсекретар Богов сидів в на темному кріслі в глибині кабінету і переглядав якісь папери. Президент нарешті повернувся від вікна до візитера.
- Я щойно повернувся з прес-конференції, ви її бачили сподіваюся - почав він спираючись обома руками на кремезний дубовий стіл. - Що ви мені там понаписували про проблеми з демократією в Рутенії?
Чиновник подивився на президента впевненим поглядом. Він був не новачок в коридорах влади і за довгі роки знав чого варто боятися. Боятися варто невизначеності. А зараз йому нарешті стало зрозуміло чого хоче від нього президент, навіщо викликав до себе. Тепер старий чиновник не боявся але і не відповідав на запитання. Президент звів брови від здивування.
- Що? Ви не зрозуміли питання? - президент Чікалова це почало дратувати, він відійшов до стола і почав обходити візитера - Я читав жураністам текст, який підготовула ваша служба для прес-конференції. В тесті йдеться, що західні держави підтримують Рутенію не дивлячись на те, що там "проблеми з демократією" і навіть деспотія... Що за чортівня?! У рейтингу ООН Рутенія стоять на тридцять позицій вище нас за "рівнем демократії"! - президент сказав останні слова жестикулюючи руками і показуючи пальцями, що "рівень демократії" потрібно взяти в лапки. - Ну, і як я виглядав при цьому? Кисло? Як я виглядав я вас питаю?.. Та поверніться до мене обличчам, чорт забирай!
Чиновник повернувся і дивився просто перед собою. Дивився не на, а наче скрізь президента і мовчав. Раптом втрутився держсекретар Богов.
- Я думаю ми можемо відпустити товариша - сказав він впевненим голосом.
Президент все ще дививився в очі мовчазному чиновнику. Він не любив такі ситуації, він - президент Чекалін господар у цьому кабінеті. Але Богову пробачалося багато. Він ківнув чиновнику:
- Можете йти.
Керівник департаменту обійшов президента і зачинив за собою двері. Богов сказав:
- Розумієш цей текст тобі писав не департамент зв’язку - держсекретар перейшов на "ти" до президента. Це підкреслювало конфеденційність сказаного. - Ми найняли тих хлопців, що займаються стретегічним плануванням. Вони запланували спецоперацію, бузу,.. такий собі бардачок в Рутенії. Але не пійшло там у них, ти ж знаєш... проект призупинили, а цей текст вже пройшов у твою канцелярію... Системна помилка, розумієш.
Президент сумно посміхнувся. Раз траплаються системні помилки, значить є система, значить система працює. Значить все нормально за великим рахунком.
Він знову підійшов до вікна. Сніг все ще падав. Тихо падав на обнесений муром старовинний плац, так само тихо, як на тисячі інших площ і домівок у його країні. Його великій країні. І ніяка помилка не зупинить ходу її історії.
|Wednesday, April 5th, 2006|
Народ! Хто ше є онлайн!
Кому до бісової матері підзвітні ті лайдаки з Робочої Групи по Вступу України до СОТ?
а) МінЕк - Яценюку
б) МЗС - Тарасюку
в) Міжвідомчій Комісії - кому саме
щодо пункту (в):
"5 вересня 2001 року підписано Указ Президента України № 797 "Про додаткові заходи щодо прискорення вступу України до СОТ". Цим документом було суттєво підвищено рівень керівництва Міжвідомчої комісії з питань вступу України до СОТ, створено постійну державну делегацію України на переговорах з вступу України до СОТ."
та делегація пов*язана з Комісією, чи просто створена за тим Указом?
Памагітє, хто може!
|Tuesday, July 19th, 2005|
Europeans want rather Ukraine in EU then Turkey
Despite great effort Turkish gvnmt do towards EU, Ukrainians are more popular. On one side, yes, Ukraine is geographically and historically European country, other hand... poor Turkisj ppl who done so much to join the EU.
|Thursday, July 7th, 2005|
|Tuesday, June 28th, 2005|
Enlargement played small role in constitution no votes
Enlargement played small role in constitution no votes - 27.06.2005
An indepth voter analysis has shown that further enlargement of the EU
featured very far down on the list of reasons why the French and the
Dutch voted against the constitution, yet rhetoric from EU politicans makes the opposite appear true.
Article >> http://euobserver.com/?aid=19430&rk=1
|Monday, June 27th, 2005|
Yulia TymoshenkoOur Europe includes Ukraine By YULIA TYMOSHENKO
Look at the article written by our Ukrainian PM. The article is exactly as she is: charming, looking naive, but very persist and optimistic.
Our Europe includes Ukraine
By YULIA TYMOSHENKO
Monday, June 27, 2005 Updated at 12:10 AM EDT
Special to Globe and Mail (Canada) Update
Long-time members of the European Union now seem to doubt its future, but we in Ukraine look at the EU with hope and admiration. To join in the EU's progress is the basic object of our foreign policy, for Ukraine has discovered that nationhood is not an end but a beginning.
Indeed, European unity is indivisible: When one nation is ostracized, all are not free. We Europeans are caught in an inescapable net, tied in a single garment of destiny. Every aspect of our shared culture, if not the last century of shared suffering, confirms that for us. Whatever affects one European directly affects all indirectly.
Never again can we afford to live with the narrow notion of two Europes, of haves and have-nots, of insiders and outsiders. Anyone who lives on the European continent cannot - indeed, must not - be considered a stranger to its union. Today's Pax Europa and pan-European prosperity depend on this.
Of course, some people mutter that Ukraine is not Europe. Let them come to Kiev and speak to the people, young and old, factory worker, farmer's wife, the lawyers and doctors and teachers who stood in the cold and snow for weeks on end last winter to defend their freedoms.
Are they not united with those who stood alongside Charles de Gaulle in the French Resistance? Are they not one with those who died fighting for the Spanish Republic in the 1930s, who liberated Budapest in 1956 and ended fascism in Spain and Portugal in the 1970s? Are they not animated by the same spirit as Poland's Solidarity and the peaceful masses that created Prague's Velvet Revolution in 1989? That is the true European spirit, and no doubts can crush it.
To those who say Ukraine is too backward for EU membership, I say: Let them, too, come to my country and see the mothers who stay late at night at work teaching their children to use their workplace computer. Let them come to the language classes in every village and city where young people are readying themselves for Europe by learning French and German and English. Those who doubt Ukraine's European vocation should understand that Europe is not a matter of hardware and superhighways; it is the unquenchable desire for freedom, prosperity and solidarity.
I believe that our future is as promising as Europe's past is proud, and that our destiny lies not as a forgotten borderland on a troubled region, but as a maker and shaper of Europe's peace and Europe's unity. Self-determination no longer means isolation, because achieving national independence nowadays means only to return to the world scene with a new status.
New nations can build with their former occupiers the same kind of fruitful relationship that France established with Germany - a relationship founded on equality and mutual interests. That is the type of relationship that my government seeks with Russia, and achieving it is how we can help extend the zone of Europe's peace.
Of course, it is premature to do more than indicate the high regard with which we view the prospect of EU membership. We know that our part in that great edifice will not be built overnight. We know that the great works of European unification lie not in documents and declarations but in innovative action designed to better the lives and insure the security of all Europeans.
Building a Ukraine worthy of EU membership will not be easy, cheap or fast. But, like the EU itself, it will be built and it will be done. We know the challenge is great, but the prize is worth the struggle, and Europe should know that this is our goal.
Part of the work of renewing Ukraine is a creative battle to put an end to a nightmarish century during which fascism and communism - ideologies born in the heart of Europe - battled for mastery. Only a few months ago, in cities throughout Ukraine, our children and our parents confronted armed troops, snarling dogs, and even death. Only a few years ago, a young journalist, Georgy Gongadze, seeking to inform the public about our old regime's corruption, was brutalized and beheaded by that regime's thugs.
But our Orange Revolution last winter shows that Ukraine's people prevailed. So, despite today's doubts and difficulties, I retain an abiding faith in Europe. I refuse to accept despair as the final response to the ambiguities and horrors of Ukraine's history. I refuse to accept the view that Ukraine is so tragically bound to the starless midnight of communism's legacy that we can never see the bright daybreak of peace and true European unity.
When the EU's citizens ponder Ukraine's place in Europe, they should look both beyond and more closely at the face they see. They should look beyond the ravaged wastelands that communism inflicted, beyond the poverty, and beyond the social divisions through which our discarded ex-leaders sought to prolong their misrule.
Instead, they should look closely at the face of our president, Viktor Yushchenko, ravaged by poison during last year's election campaign, and recall the words of the great Frenchman André Malraux, for whom "the most beautiful faces are those that have been wounded."!
Yulia Tymoshenko is Prime Minister of Ukraine.
|Saturday, June 25th, 2005|
Spirit of forgiveness unites Poles and Ukrainians
Published: June 25 2005
Western Europeans may have forgotten that one fundamental reason for the creation of the European Union was to keep ancient enemies from going to war, but the lesson remains fresh for Poland and Ukraine.
Just as the EU helped end hatred and misunderstanding between France and Germany, Poland is hoping that the prospect of EU membership for Ukraine will play a similarly constructive role in eastern Europe - despite complications following the French and Dutch referendum rejection of an EU constitution.
"This wave of reconciliation is moving from west to east. First it was between the French and Germans, then between Poles and Germans and now it is Poles and Ukrainians," said Janusz Onyszkiewicz, a former Polish defence minister and now a member of the European Parliament.
Yesterday leading Polish and Ukrainian politicians met in the west Ukraine city of Lviv to take part in the formal reopening of a Polish military cemetery that has been a source of contention for decades.
In 1919, a newly independent Poland fought against Ukrainian forces over the ownership of Lviv, an ethnically Polish and Jewish city surrounded by a Ukrainian-majority countryside.
The Poles won, and built a grand pantheon to the young fighters who had fought for Lwow, Lviv's Polish name.
The Polish victory was reversed after the second world war. The Jews were murdered in the Holocaust, millions of Poles were expelled by the Soviets and the area - now almost entirely ethnically Ukrainian - was incorporated into the USSR, and later independent Ukraine.
The cemetery stayed although Soviet authorities bulldozed part of it and the rest fell into disrepair.
The cemetery's restoration ceremony ends one historical dispute, and bishops from both countries took steps last weekend to end others.
In language that purposely echoed a similar appeal by Polish bishops to their German counterparts 40 years ago, Roman Catholic bishops from Poland and Greek Catholic bishops from Ukraine signed a call for mutual reconciliation.
"We forgive and we ask for forgiveness," said the statement from the two churches.
Before the second world war, the Polish government clamped down on Ukrainian nationalists, who responded with a low level terror campaign.
During the war, Ukrainian militias murdered tens of thousands of Poles, and after the war the Polish military killed thousands of Ukrainians on the Polish side of the border and deported more than 100,000. Those memories remained fresh for decades and healed slowly only after the end of communism.
Unlike Serbs in the former Yugoslavia, Poles did not reopen issues of borders and population transfers. Poland was the first country to recognise an independent Ukraine in December 1991. Polish politicians and thousands of ordinary people flooded into Ukraine during last year's Orange Revolution and helped push the issue to the forefront of the EU's concerns.
"The new Ukrainian government is more willing to pursue reconciliation. From the Polish side, they really look at Ukraine differently," said Hryhory Nemyria, chairman of Kiev's International Renaissance Foundation. "There has always been a gap between the political leaders, who were more ready for reconciliation, and that of the populations, particularly in border regions. Since the Orange Revolution you can see that gap decreasing."
Historical reconciliation has been helped by expanding economic ties, too. Last year, trade between the two totalled $3bn (€2.5bn, £1.7bn), up by a third over 2003, and overall Polish investments in Ukraine came to $192m.
Ukrainian steel producer Donbas Industrial Union is finalising the takeover of Polish steel maker Huta Czestochowa. Ukrainian car maker AvtoZAZ is concluding the purchase of struggling Polish carmaker FSO with Poland's Treasury.
|Friday, June 24th, 2005|
Meet the neighbours (From The Economist print edition)
Meet the neighbours
Jun 23rd 2005The European Union has been expanding by leaps and bounds. Robert Cottrell (interviewed here) asks what happens if it stops
From The Economist print edition
Get article background
“WE MUST not let daylight in upon the magic,” said Walter Bagehot, a former editor of this newspaper, contending that the authority of the British crown resided more in the mystique of the institution than in what we might now call hard power. Awe-struck politicians and public opinion in Bagehot's 19th-century Britain behaved as though the monarch was above criticism, the incarnation of wisdom and virtue. But for that to go on working, Bagehot said, the precise mechanics and limitations of the office, and of its incumbents, should remain obscure.
The European Union used to profit from a similar indulgence. It enjoyed a mystique founded on its claim to be a new and more perfect type of political order, capable of guaranteeing a lasting European peace. The complexity of its laws and institutions helped, by blurring popular understanding of what the Union did, and thus allowing both admirers and critics to make exaggerated claims about its powers.
Now the daylight is streaming in on Europe, and the magic has gone. Last year's enlargement of the Union, from 15 to 25 countries, has played a big part in this change, as has the recent constitutional debate. Almost nobody now imagines that all 25 countries are heading for political union in the way that the founding six once talked of doing. It is by no means outlandish, as it would have seemed ten years ago, to suggest that the Union may go the way of the United Nations, or even the Western European Union, to become an organisation with much less political and legal authority, or none at all. This would be manageable for existing members, so long as the single market and the euro continued in business by other means. It would, on the other hand, be seen as a catastrophe by nearby countries counting on Union accession to rescue them from their other neighbours or from themselves. An end to enlargement, of which some EU politicians now talk, would be just as bad.
This survey looks to the east, where the limits to Europe are most changeable. The question of where to situate those limits has returned in force since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Last year's enlargement fixed the Union's eastern borders at the distant edges of the Baltic states, and of Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. Now, of 15 contiguous countries lying to the east and south-east of those new borders, at least 11 more hope to become EU members, most of them within the next ten years or so, subject to various ifs and buts.
Romania and Bulgaria have already signed their accession treaties and expect to join in 2007 and 2008, though the treaties have yet to be ratified by all EU parliaments. Turkey has a date to start accession talks in October, though that process, if it does begin then, may drag on for a decade or more. Croatia hopes to begin detailed talks once it can persuade the EU that it is co-operating fully with the UN's war-crimes tribunal in The Hague. The other countries of the western Balkans—Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro—have been promised EU membership in principle, but without a timetable.
Ukraine wants to join, but may be ten years away from starting talks. Moldova and Georgia would love to follow. At the back of these countries looms Russia. It has no desire to join the Union as an ordinary member, but it fears loss of influence in eastern Europe, and it has long tried to construct a countervailing block of ex-Soviet countries, with itself at the centre.
This survey will look beyond the recent post-constitutional doom and gloom about Europe's future, to argue in favour of continued enlargement of the Union as the best way to manage relations with neighbouring countries, save for Russia. But it will base that argument on the proposition that enlargement is turning the Union into a more loose-knit and pragmatic undertaking into which new members can more easily be fitted—if necessary by denying them some of the rights and privileges which older members enjoy. It presumes that the French-led rejection of the EU constitution, once the dust has settled, will encourage movement towards a looser Union, even if that is not what French voters intended. The French “no” said, in effect, that even France, long the champion of ever closer union, wanted to be less in thrall to the thing it has created.
The history of the Union can almost be written in terms of its struggle to find alternatives to membership which it could offer to keep its neighbours happy but excluded. Each time the Union has failed brilliantly, agreeing to an enlargement and making it work. That is a thought to encourage Turkey, Albania or Ukraine, none of which will be inside the Union for years yet, but none of which can decently be excluded for ever, or while the Union lasts, whatever Europe's current mood.
The EU's latest non-membership strategy for nearby countries, launched two years ago, goes by the name of the “European Neighbourhood Policy”. Under this policy, the Union offers the countries of North Africa, the Mediterranean, the southern Caucasus and eastern Europe graduated access to the single market, plus financial and technical aid, in exchange for reforms bringing them closer to the Union's political and economic models. But these things are presented as a substitute for membership, not as a precursor to it. Countries can aim for a partnership with the Union so close that it brings them “everything but the institutions”, said Romano Prodi in 2002, when he was president of the European Commission.
That makes the European Neighbourhood Policy something bigger, but not necessarily better, than the “Barcelona Process”, a programme the EU launched in 1995 to offer the countries of the southern Mediterranean market access, plus cash and technical aid, in exchange for economic and political reforms, but with no prospect of membership. The EU will have spent almost euro9 billion in the region by the end of 2006, with very little to show in return. “The economic performance of the region has stagnated...political reform has also been almost non-existent. Societal trends, for example tendencies in favour of radical Islam, are deeply worrying,” according to a recent study by Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva of the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels.
If the European Neighbourhood Policy offers the countries of eastern Europe and the southern Caucasus much the same incentives that the Barcelona Process offered the countries of the southern Mediterranean, it is in danger of producing much the same results. “So far, it is easier to find reasons for scepticism than optimism” about the European Neighbourhood Policy, say Ben Slay and Susanne Milcher, economists with the United Nations Development Programme in Bratislava. The Union spreads its values most effectively through peer-pressure for change, linked to hopes of accession. Without such hopes, governments lose motivation. Aid, even market access, is no substitute.
This survey therefore recommends reversing the headline aims of the European Neighbourhood Policy, at least where the Union's neighbours to the east are concerned. It suggests offering membership in name to any country that can meet Europe's basic criteria (of functioning democratic institutions, a market economy, and the capacity to implement EU law), but membership with restricted rights. If one decisive objection to Turkish membership, for example, is that Turkey's big population will give it too large a voting weight in the EU's Council of Ministers, then better all round if Turkey is allowed to join the Union but with its voting rights restricted, perhaps giving it no vote on “constitutional” issues, and no veto at all.
George speaks, Georgia listens
This approach would mean that EU membership, certainly for new members, would count for less. But if this survey is right to see a more fragmented Union emerging, with more limited political ambitions, then membership is starting to count for less anyway.
The idea that the Union is needed to stop its founding members from going to war with one another has long faded. Stripped of its early Utopian rhetoric, the Union can be seen as the sum of its functions and nothing more. Some of those functions are good (such as the single market, and the Schengen agreement to open internal borders). Some are bad (such as the common agricultural policy). All are open to debate. It is external security threats, and relative economic stagnation, that worry European countries now, and countries differ about how best to tackle them. Flexibility is needed.
Conventional wisdom in Brussels has come round to the idea that not every country needs to take part in every Union project. This is already being put into practice, but as the exception rather than the rule. Only 12 of the EU's 15 pre-2004 members have joined the euro zone, for example, and only 13 of the 15 have implemented the Schengen convention abolishing internal borders.
This is the trend that used to be called, disparagingly, “Europe à la carte”, meaning the freedom for countries to pick and choose between the projects they wanted to join and the commitments they wanted to make within the Union. Once countries were allowed to diverge in some things, the argument went, they would diverge in all things, and the Union would break up altogether.
In some ways, the Union is indeed growing weaker. The supranational institutions are losing ground against nations and governments. Just look at Germany's and France's revolt this year against the stability and growth pact, which was supposed to be a foundation of Europe's monetary union; or at France's overturning of the services directive, which would have doubled the scope of the single market; or at the debacle over the constitution.
But “Europe à la carte” may yet mean a happier and more effective Union, if it means that more things get done. Not all EU countries want to harmonise their corporate taxes, or share a public prosecutor, or pool their votes in the International Monetary Fund, but that is no reason why sub-groups of them should not agree to do so. Any trade-off between the “widening” and the “deepening” of Europe is proving less simple than advocates of either course have usually claimed. A widening Europe is a more uneven Europe, deep in some places and shallow in others.
What matters externally is that Europe's political and economic values should go on penetrating and changing the countries round about. It may sound arrogant to talk of the Union as offering the only viable model for European states, but so far the alternatives are not encouraging. Ukraine and Georgia have revolted against a post-Soviet model of crony capitalism and rigged democracy. Moldova is half-way to following, and Belarus may do so one day. European liberalism offers Turkey the best hope of preserving its delicate balance between moderate Islamic society and secular state. For the Balkans, Europe appears to be the only possible escape from post-war poverty and isolation.
The main organised challenge to the European model comes from Russia, which covers or dominates the rest of the extended continent. Russia is still in a process of self-discovery, but seems to show a continuing strong bias towards authoritarianism, so far of a mild and partial kind. It is enough to worry most western countries but not yet to repel them. EU countries disagree about how best to manage relations with Russia, because of their different interests and different experiences there. The main common strand in their relations is an imprudent but increasing reliance on Russian energy.
The United States is also deeply interested in the countries to the east of the EU, bringing its own priorities and policies to bear. America has most to fear from an anti-democratic Russia allied with an anti-democratic China. It needs either a strong democratic Russia, or a weak Russia regardless of government. In either case, prising away the countries around Russia's borders, and building friendly democracies there, is a step in the right direction. That is what George Bush has been doing this year—reassuring the Baltics, praising Ukraine, encouraging Georgia's new pro-western government, and inciting the Belarussians to get rid of their dictator, Alexander Lukashenka.
This puts pressure on Europe to take sides. Either it offers these new and future post-Soviet democracies the prospect of membership in some form, which is what they and America would wish. Or it says to them that they do not belong to the West, but to some vague domain between the EU and Russia—where, in effect, Russia could dominate them.
Given the deficiencies of Russia's political and economic institutions, there is a strong case for Europe to reach out more boldly to Ukraine, and Moldova, and Georgia, just as it should to the western Balkans and Turkey. But it is important to recognise the resistance to further enlargement that has grown within the Union countries, and the reasons for it. Further enlargement of the Union in its present form would mean open borders with the Balkans, Chinese-level wages in some labour markets, and Turkey as the greatest power at summits in Brussels. There would be much to be said for each of these things, but not nearly enough to win over public and political opinion.
The issue for the EU is no longer how to export stability and prosperity to the countries around it. It has learnt how to do that through enlargement. The issue is how to continue enlarging, how to persuade public opinion within the Union that stability and prosperity can be exported without importing instability and poverty in exchange. That is doubly difficult when public scepticism cuts so deep. A majority of voters in France, and perhaps in other countries too, seems to doubt that the Union is a force for stability and prosperity even across its present membership. This is dangerous disenchantment.
To meet the neighbours, and to consider further what continued enlargement, or the lack of it, might mean to them, this survey will begin with those countries that joined the EU last year, and those on the point of joining in a couple of years' time, Bulgaria and Romania. It will then adventure into the wider and wilder Europe beyond, moving through the Balkans and eastern Europe before coming to rest on Turkey's Black Sea shores. It will see Russia as a country set apart from the rest of Europe by history and geography, but it will look to a Russian monarch, Catherine the Great, for the pithiest summary of Europe's place in the world. “I have no way to defend my borders”, she once said, “except to extend them.”
|Tuesday, June 21st, 2005|
I love the Polish "image improving" initative...
DEAR UKRAINIANS: WHERE ARE OUR ADVERTISING LIKE THIS POLISH ONE? Look at that below... We need like that too. 'Polish plumber' beckons French
New "Polish plumber": A humorous counter-blast from the east
The Polish tourist board has come up with a seductive image of a Polish plumber to counter negative French rhetoric about east European workers.
The "Polish plumber" - a symbol of cheap labour - became a catchphrase of the French "No" camp during the referendum on the EU constitution.
"I'm staying in Poland - do come over," says the new ad on the Polish tourist board's website for French visitors.
The site carries messages from French readers praising the ad's humour.
Elzbieta Janik, spokeswoman for the Polish tourist board, said she and her colleagues were "annoyed that a negative image of Poland was being used by politicians... to avoid the real political problems".
The ad was produced by the tourist board's Warsaw headquarters to "help us create a positive image of Poland," she told the BBC News website.
"We have been given a label we don't deserve. After all, France has plenty of Spanish stone masons, Portuguese workers...
"This was a humorous response to the political debate - we wanted to tell the French: 'Despite the bad words about Poland you are welcome'," she said.
Posters and T-shirts bearing the handsome Polish plumber image might also be produced, she said.
"French people have phoned up to congratulate us. They told us: 'We're not dupes, we know Polish plumbers are not to blame'," she added.
|Thursday, June 2nd, 2005|
I' ve sent the letter in support of Joschka Fischer
I'm tired of this anti-Ukrainian and anti-east-european campaign today in Germany. Today I heard on Canadian Ukrainian FM from some German opposition leader something like: "They, Ukrainians, come to German to work illegal..." Shame on you speaker!.. That's over. We have to support J.Fischer.
Honourable German Minister of Foreign Affaires
Mr. Joschka Fischer
Dear Minister Joschka Fischer,
On behalf of thousands of eastern Europeans and Ukrainians
particularly, I’d like to express my sincere respect to Your and your
government’s outstanding position to protect our human rights.
I know Your government and You have a tough time today because of “the
visa scandal”. You were an author of one very human and very opportune
regulation to alleviate way to Germany for eastern European visitors.
Thousands of my compatriots have visited your beautiful country and it
was really “the Europe vision changing” experience for many. They come
back to change their countries and never forget such opportunity to
open Europe for yourself.
If some visitors have broken the low and regulations this cases had to
be treated as it supposed to be. But my deep concern – this is not a
political subject. No more prejudice and human discriminations toward
eastern European and especially to unfairly keeping out of the
European integration process Ukrainians.
To get a visitor visa is a tough business to thousands and thousands
loyal and positively minded Ukrainians. It not supposed to be like
this. Hopefully, within few last years it’s more convenient with
German embassy. Please, keep the way.
|Tuesday, May 17th, 2005|
|Friday, May 13th, 2005|
Une Constitution pour l’Europe.C’est qu’on dirait là sur l’Ukraine?
Donc, les pays de EU votes pour la Constitution. C’est quoi cette Constitution à nous, les Ukrainiens?
On ne peut pas trouver le mot « l’Ukraine » là bas, et c’est correct, parce que la Constitution (ou plutôt les extraits explorées par moi-même) ne fait pas de mention des pays particulières. C’est juste une framework et c’est bon.
C’est quoi est « pas bon » que dans une brochure officiel (Pourquoi une Constitution européenne?
) j’ai là trouvé une mention de « 25 pays participants ». Et l’Ukraine, est-elle compté dans ce nombre? Je croix non, donc, pourquoi cette chiffre de 25? Et quoi, si l’Ukraine deviendra une belle jour 26-me? Réécrire tout ces brochures?
Heureusement dans autre document de support en ligne Foire Des Questions
c’est plus claire et semble plus resonable. C’est quoi moi, comme une citoyen ukrainien interesse là c’est deux chapitres suivantes.
5. La Constitution définit-elle les limites géographiques de l'Union?
Pas vraiment. L’article I-1 dispose:«L’Union est ouverte à tous les États
européens qui respectent ses valeurs et qui s'engagent à les promouvoir en
commun». Faute de définition juridique, le qualificatif «européen» figurant
dans cet article doit être interprété à la lumière de considérations
géographiques, historiques et politiques.
Aspect plus important encore, les pays candidats doivent s’engager à
défendre les valeurs de l'Union dont il est fait état à l’article I-2: respect de
la dignité humaine, liberté, démocratie, égalité, État de droit et respect des
droits de l'homme, notamment en ce qui concerne les minorités.
Il convient également de tenir compte de l’article I-57 de la Constitution
relatif aux relations privilégiées que l’Union pourrait établir avec les pays
(Comment : Voila, c’est bien correct)
6. La Constitution facilitera-t-elle l’adhésion de nouveaux pays?
Non. Pour qu’un pays puisse adhérer à l’Union, il faudra toujours que le
Conseil statue à l’unanimité et que le Parlement européen consente à
l’ouverture des négociations. Lorsque celles-ci sont achevées, un accord
formel doit être conclu et ratifié par tous les États membres et par le pays
candidat lui-même (voir article I-58).
Les conditions effectives qu’un pays doit remplir avant son adhésion sont un
peu plus strictes qu’auparavant. L’article I-58 spécifie que le pays candidat
doit respecter les valeurs fondamentales de l’Union, notamment le respect
de la dignité humaine, la liberté, la démocratie, l’égalité, l’État de droit et le
respect des droits de l'homme, y compris en ce qui concerne les minorités
(voir article I-2). Le pays candidat devra de surcroît respecter ces valeurs,
mais aussi s’engager à les promouvoir (voir article I-1).
(Comment : « un accord … par tous les États membres » - c’est pas facile… Si, par exemple, les roumaines, les membres de UE, voulais cette penisule Ukrainien dans la mer Noire, comme ils on fait aujourd’hui (!)... Donc, la Roumaine peut faire du chantage pour accepter l’Ukraine dans l’UE.)
Et moi, mes amis, je n’aime pas la façon duquel on parle dans ces brochures sur nouveaux membres. C’est comme les auteurs toujours fait pardon que ces nouveaux existent… C’est une mouvais ton de la bureaucratie européen. C’est ça la plus grande problème externe d’intégration de l’Ukraine : mauvais perception par élite dans Brussel.